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NOTES & COMMENTS
EXPANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS
An important trend is developing within the criminal law field:
state courts are interpreting provisions in their constitutions more
expansively than United States Supreme Court decisions construing
similar provisions in the Federal Constitution.' Consequently, crimi-
nal defendants are often being afforded greater protection under their
state Bill of Rights than under the federal Bill of Rights. While some
commentators have hailed this trend as indicative of a healthy feder-
alism,2 the methods adopted by state courts to expand individual
rights present several difficulties. These problems arise because of the
Supreme Court doctrine of selective incorporation3 which has affected
state criminal procedure by entrusting the protection of certain basic
rights to the federal government. Only by analyzing this doctrine's
impact on state procedure can the ramifications of these expansive
state decisions be adequately examined.
In the constitutional convention prior to the adoption of the Fed-
eral Constitution, the delegates realized that more power should be
given to the national government than had been provided in the
unsuccessful Articles of Confederation.' Nevertheless, the framers
developed a federal system in which the individual states exercised
all powers except those specifically granted to the national
government.5 During the debates over adoption of the Constitution,
its proponents emphasized the limited nature of the national govern-
ment and the ultimate responsibility of the states to insure individual
I See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272 (1976); State v.
Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66
(1975).
2 See, e.g., Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky.
L. J. 873 (1975); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L. J. 421 (1974); Note, Robinson at Large in the
Fifty States: A Continuation of the State Bills of Rights Debate in the Search and
Seizure Context, 5 GoLDEN GATE L. Rav. 1 (1974).
According to this doctrine once a right is deemed "fundamental" it is incorpo-
rated into the fourteenth amendment and is therefore binding on the states. See text
accompanying notes 27-42 infra.
IA. PREscorr, DPRA'ING THE FEDERAL CONSTrrUTON 812 (1941); see Brennan, The
Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 761 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Bren-
nan].
5 Brennan, supra note 4.
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liberties.6 The Constitution's strongest supporters, therefore, argued
that since the federal government held such limited powers there was
no need for a federal Bill of Rights.7 However, the opponents of the
Constitution prevailed on this issue, and a federal Bill of Rights was
specifically created to act as an additional check on the powers of the
federal government.'
Any doubt concerning the intended scope of the federal Bill of
Rights was resolved by the Supreme Court in Barron v. Baltimore.,
Chief Justice Marshall wrote the unanimous opinion holding that the
federal Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government.'0 The
6 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 133 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966) (J. Madison), in which
James Madison states:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite . . . . The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and proper-
ties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosper-
ity of the State.
Id. at 137.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 259 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966) (A. Hamilton). Believing
that a federal Bill of Rights would be meaningless and taking freedom of the press as
an example, Hamilton argued that since the federal government had not been granted
any power to restrict the press, there was no sense in creating a prohibition against
restricting the press. Since the power had not been granted, it was not capable of being
abused. This argument may have been more of a response to the error of the Constitu-
tional Convention in omitting a Bill of Rights from the text of the Constitution than a
true belief that a national Bill of Rights would be superfluous. J. LEWIS, ANTI-
FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS 54 (1967). The authors, and particularly Hamilton
who wrote Number 84, were trapped into advocating a non-Bill of Rights position for
two reasons. First, a Bill of Rights was unnecessary unless they admitted that the
Constitutional Convention had done an ineffective and incomplete job. Second, recog-
nizing the need for a national Bill of Rights in the Constitution proposed for ratification
by the states would undermine the validity of the draft Constitution as a document
sufficient to secure and maintain liberty. Id. at 54-55.
8 L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERI-
CAN HISTORY 266 (1960). The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions exemplify political
thought during the early days of the nation and demonstrate the view that was taken
of the Bill of Rights. In the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the same anti-
federalists who supported the existence of a federal Bill of Rights erected them into a
"bill of wrongs" the Congress must not commit. Id. During the early decades of the
nineteenth century, the rhetoric about the Bill of Rights acting as a constitutional
limitation on the power of the federal government was invoked more to promote sec-
tional power than to protect individual liberty. H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION 10
(1973). See also Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8
HARv. CIv. RIGHTS - Civ. Lm. L. REv. 271, 276-77 (1973).
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 464 (1833).
10 Id. at 468.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
Barron Court clearly stated that since state constitutions had bills of
rights, the individual must rely exclusively on them for protection
against his state." This bifurcated system for protection of individual
liberties was consistently approved,"2 and remained unchanged until
the passage of the reconstruction amendments after the Civil War. 3
Although historically the purpose of a Bill of Rights was to reserve
certain privileges to individuals and thereby limit the prerogatives
available to the government, the bifurcated system of state and
federal Bills of Rights established by the Barron Court was incapable
of serving that purpose effectively since the state provisions only
protected against state activities and the federal amendments only
applied to federal activities. As a result, both the state and federal
governments were powerless to protect fundamental rights from all
governmental infringement. The theory of a total separation of state
and federal Bills of Rights assumes that both the state and federal
governments will provide at least minimum protection for individual
liberties." Yet the Civil War amendments focused attention on this
unsound assumption and pointed out the conceptual weakness of
trying to protect basic rights through numerous autonomous sys-
tems."
In drafting the fourteenth amendment,'7 Congress sought to insure
that the individual rights granted would be protected from state dep-
rivations.'" The original draft was sent back to the Judiciary Commit-
tee and the phrase "No state" was inserted to protect against state
'I In Barron, a wharf owner attempted to invoke the fifth amendment against the
City of Baltimore in his suit for damages for the destruction of his wharf by the city.
The Court held that whatever rights the wharf owner might have would have to be
found under state law. Id.
12 See, e.g., Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84 (1857); Smith v. Maryland,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 447 (1847).
'" U.S. CONST. amends. XIH, XIV & XV. .
" THE FEDERAST No. 84, at 262 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966) (A. Hamilton).
" See, Note, Robinson At Large in the Fifty States: A Continuation of the State
Bills of Rights Debate in the Search and Seizure Context, 5 GoLDEN GATE L. REV. 1, 9
(1974).
" Project Report: Toward an Activist Role For State Bills of Rights, 8 H~Av. Cry.
IbGHTS - Civ. Lm. L. REv. 271, 278 (1973).
,7U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 states in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
,See H. BRANNON, THE FouRTEENTH AMiENDMENT 138 (1901); C. COLUNS, THE
FouRrwiNi AMEDMENT AND THE STATES 29 (1912).
1976]
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abridgement of those rights guaranteed under the Federal Constitu-
tion.1 Although Congress intended that the amendment broadly pro-
tect individual rights, within five years of its enactment the Supreme
Court rendered a very restrictive interpretation in the Slaughter-
House Cases."' There, the Court construed the privileges and immun-
ities clause of the fourteenth amendment' to apply only to those
rights which owed "their existence to the Federal government, its
National character, its Constitution, or its laws."22 The Court rea-
soned that a broad application of the fourteenth amendment would
encroach upon each state's freedom in regulating individual rights.2
This restrictive view of the fourteenth amendment was consistently
upheld 4 until the development of the "absorption" theory,2 subse-
quently refined into a "selective incorporation" doctrine,2 6 which
transformed the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution
into national statements of basic liberties.
The theory of "incorporating" or "absorbing" the specific provi-
sions of the federal Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment
developed in response to the need for national protection of individ-
ual rights.27 Since the fourteenth amendment specifically proscribes
"1 Hemphill, State Action and Civil Rights, 23 MERCER L. REV. 519, 523-25 (1972).
10 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
21 See note 17 supra.
2 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79. The Court cited certain rights which were exclusively
protected by the Federal Constitution such as the right to travel, the right to petition
for redress of grievances, and the right to use the navigable waters of the United States.
Id. at 79-80.
In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court stated:
to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights
heretofore belonging exclusively to the States . . . [would be] to fet-
ter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the
control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally
conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character
Id. at 77-78.
2, E.g., Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
2 See text accompanying notes 27-33 infra.
28 See text accompanying notes 34-40 infra.
2 The premise of the absorption theory is that the specific provision in the federal
Bill of Rights is absorbed into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
thereby making the provision enforceable against the states. This proposition has been
and continues to be a debatable issue of historical interpretation. Compare H. FLACK,
THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908) and Crosskey, Charles Fairman,
"Legislative History, " and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954), with Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) and Morrison,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial
Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949). See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
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state activities," the effect of absorbing one of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights into the due process clause is to make the specific
provision applicable to the states. The significance of this theory is
that authority for protecting a right depends on the actual nature of
the right itself, rather than on which government happens to be
abridging the right 9 or whether the right was "national" in origin. 0
The test that the Court devised for deciding to absorb a particular
right involved an inquiry into whether the right was so fundamental
as to be "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."'" This
analysis was initially utilized to absorb the first amendment,2 but
was subsequently used in decisions dealing with other amendments
in the Bill of Rights.1
3
This test was slightly modified over the years by the process of
selective incorporation.34 Although the decision to incorporate a right
remained subjective, the Court evaluated the right in the specific
context of the anglo-american system of justice rather than in the
abstract.3 Using this case-by-case process of exclusion and inclusion,
the Court, particularly during the 1960's, applied to the states almost
all of the rights guaranteed by the federal Bill of Rights.30 Further,
2 See note 17 supra.
21 See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
3' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). This "flexible" test examines
the fundamental nature of the right to ascertain if it is so basic to our system of justice
as to require incorporation into the due process clause. In contrast, Justice Black took
the approach that the fourteenth amendment was meant to incorporate the Bill of
Rights without regard to the fundamental nature of the right. Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); see Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960).
32 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
1 E.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (fourth amendment); Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (fifth amendment).
" See Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE
L. J. 74 (1963); Lacy, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Evolu-
tion of the Absorption Doctrine, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 37 (1966).
11 Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YAMX L.
J. 74, 82 (1963). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968).
3' Rights which have been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and are
therefore binding on the states are: the first amendment, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925) (freedom of speech and press); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(freedom of religion); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1936) (freedom of
assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances); the fourth amendment,
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (freedom from unreasonable searches); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the exclusionary rule); the fifth amendment: Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (just privilege against self-
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under the theory of selective incorporation, once a right is incorpo-
rated into the fourteenth amendment, it has the exact limiting effect
on state activities that the applicable amendment has on federal
activities.1
7
Recently there has been a gradual yet significant shift in the in-
corporation philosophy of the Supreme Court. While the Court still
adheres to a selective incorporation theory," the emphasis on apply-
ing the full sweep of a federal right against the states is lacking. 9
Thus, many judicially developed requirements which delineate the
incrimination); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy clause); the
sixth amendment, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); In Re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right
to confrontation); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Wash-
ington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process for obtaining witnesses);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (trial by jury); the eighth amendment,
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment).
E.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), in which Justice Brennan stated:
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the petitioner
the protection of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination, and that under the applicable federal standard, the
[state court] erred ... [Previously incorporated rights are] en-
forced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according
to the same standards that protect those personal rights against fed-
eral encroachment.
Id. at 3, 10 (emphasis added). See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
In each decision espousing the philosophy of selective incorporation, there were
vigorous dissents or concurrences in which it was argued that the far-reaching effect
of the selective incorporation philosophy would be total uniformity between state and
federal criminal systems. For example, Justice Harlan stated:
[T1he States have been put in a federal mold with respect to this
aspect of criminal law enforcement, thus depriving the country of the
opportunity to observe the effects of different procedures in similar
settings.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). One commentator has found that the logical consequence of the
incorporation doctrine is that the right becomes applicable to the states with all of the
overlays of judicial gloss which the Supreme Court has developed in applying the right
to the federal government. See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REv. 929, 935 (1965).
u Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) (citing with apparent approvaI
the Malloy v. Hogan incorporation of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (reversing decision due to
failure of trial court to apply fully the right to confrontation incorporated in Pointer
v. Texas); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (assuming the incorporation of
the fourth amendment).
"' See Cord, Neo-Incorporation: The Burger Court and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 44 FoRD. L. REv. 215 (1975).
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contours of a right in the federal system are no longer forced upon the
states through the selective incorporation doctrine."0 Perhaps influ-
enced by this philosophic change, a rapidly increasing number of
state courts41 have declined to follow Supreme Court decisions in the
criminal law area, and have established higher standards within their
respective states based upon the authority of state constitutions.42
Indicative of this trend is the recent New Jersey Supreme Court
decision of State v. Johnson.3 The issue in Johnson concerned the
proper procedure to be followed by the police in conducting a consent
search. In dealing with the identical problem," the United States
40 Illustrative of the Court's aversion to applying the precise federal standards
surrounding an incorporated right are the Court's decisions dealing with the sixth
amendment's right to jury trial. The right was incorporated in the 1960's in an opinion
that appeared to include all the "bag and baggage" of federal judicial precedent.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 213 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring). However, in
recent decisions, the Court has held that the sixth amendment does not require the
states to meet the federal precedents of juries consisting of 12 members, Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), or unanimous verdicts, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
,1 See Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L. J.
873 (1975).
42 The trend among the state courts is to ground the decision on the provision in
the state constitution which parallels the applicable amendment in the Federal Consti-
tution. See note 41 supra.
43 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975). The following is a representative sampling of
recent state court decisions that have expanded individual criminal rights beyond the
applicable standard of the Supreme Court: Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alas. 1974)
(disclosing names of alibi witnesses prior to trial); People v. Disbrow, 127 Cal. Rptr.
360, 545 P.2d 272 (1976) (use of statements obtained in violation of fifth amendment);
People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3rd 528, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975) (scope
of searches) discussed in, Jordan, The Brisendine Case: Progression in the Area of
Warrantless Searches, 3 WEST. ST. L. REV. 1 (1975); Note, People v. Brisendine-
California Limits the Scope of Weapons Search Incident to Male Prohibita Citation
Offenses, 7 WEST. L. A. L. REV. 253 (1975); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d
51 (1974) (scope of search); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971)
(admissibility of compelled statements to impeach); State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620
(Me. 1972) (burden of establishing admissibility); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554,
227 N.W. 2d 511 (1975) (electronic eavesdropping); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323,
217 N.W. 2d 22 (1974); Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1974) (right to
counsel) discussed in, Note, Commonwealth v. Richman: A State's Extension of Proce-
dural Rights Beyond Supreme Court Requirements, 13 DuQ. L. REV. 577 (1975); Com-
monwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432 (Pa. 1973) (double jeopardy). A much more
detailed summary of many of these cases can be found in Wilkes, More on the New
Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L. J. 873 (1975); Wilkes, The New Federal-
ism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L. J. 421
(1974).
" The United States Supreme Court sets standards for searches in accordance
with the provisions of the fourth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1976]
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Supreme Court had previously held that the police were not required
to inform a person that he could refuse to consent to a search. 5 The
Court had stated that in determining whether the consent was given
voluntarily and was uncoerced the "totality of the circumstances"
should be the governing standard. 6 Nevertheless, the New Jersey
court held that consent to search was not voluntary unless the person
giving the consent was expressly informed of his right to refuse." The
Johnson court stated that this result was required under the New
Jersey constitution4" although acknowledging that the state provision
was taken almost verbatim from the fourth amendment in the United
States Constitution." The court analyzed the consent issue in terms
of a "waiver" of a known right and held that - notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's rejection of the "waiver" rationale" - it would
henceforth be the governing standard under state law.5'
In another search and seizure case, State v. Kaluna,52 the Hawaii
Supreme Court held that the scope of a search incident to a lawful
arrest should be limited to protecting the arresting officer and seizing
evidence or fruits of the crime." The Kaluna court acknowledged that
the United States Supreme Court had previously held that a full body
search was permissible after any custodial arrest,54 but stated that the
Hawaii constitution55 afforded its citizens greater protection from
governmental intrusions than provided by the textually similar provi-
'5 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
45 Id.
, 346 A.2d at 68.
46 N.J. CONST. art I, par. 7. The defendant in Johnson pleaded a violation of his
Federal Constitutional rights under the fourth amendment. The issue of protection
under the state constitution was brought up by the state court on its own motion. 346
A.2d at 68. While a court may properly examine its jurisdiction on its own motion,
Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884), the propriety
of a court raising defenses to a criminal prosecution by way of its own motion is
questionable. A.B.A. CANNONS OF JuDIcAL ETHcs No. 3.
41 346 A.2d at 68 n.2.
The Supreme Court in Schneckloth refused to apply the standard of a knowing
and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right to the issue of consent to a search. The
Court held that the waiver rationale only applied to those rights needed to preserve a
fair trial. 412 U.S. at 235.
11 346 A.2d at 68.
12 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
' 520 P.2d at 61.
', See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), in which the Court held
that a full body search was reasonable under the fourth amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
11 HAwAII CONST. art. I, § 5.
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sion in the federal Bill of Rights."5 In determining the applicable
search and seizure standard under state law, the Kaluna court noted
that as long as the result was greater protection of individual rights,
a United States Supreme Court opinion was "merely another source
of authority" which it could adopt or reject in determining the precise
contours of a right under state law.57
An individual's privilege against self-incrimination has also been
subjected to conflicting interpretations by state and federal courts."
The United States Supreme Court has held that statements by crimi-
nal defendants which are obtained in violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination,"9 while inadmissible as affirmative evidence, can
nevertheless be used to impeach the defendant's trial testimony as
long as the statements were not coerced. However, in People v.
Disbrow," the California Supreme Court recently held that as a mat-
ter of state constitutional law,"1 a statement obtained in violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination could not be used by the pros-
ecution for any purpose." The Disbrow court rejected the federal
precedent primarily because juries, even with a limiting instruction,
might consider the defendant's extra-judicial statements as substan-
tive evidence of guilt rather than as merely a reflection on credibil-
ity. 3 Thus, the California court specifically reaffirmed its power to
independently define individual rights based on state law."
520 P.2d at 58.
Id. at 58 n.6.
Compare Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), with People v. Disbrow, 127
Cal. Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272 (1976). The fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and made applicable
to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
51' Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The particular violation of the privi-
lege was a failure to abide by the requirements enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272 (1976).
SCAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 15. The language of this state provision is similar to the
fifth amendment to the Federal Constitution: "Persons may not ... be compelled in
a criminal cause to be a witness against themselves ..
*' 545 P.2d at 280.
545 P.2d 279. The court in Disbrow also expressed concern that the federal
precedent would encourage police misconduct since the illegally obtained statements
would be available to the prosecution if the defendant attempts to take the stand in
his own defense. Id.
56 In People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975),
the California Supreme Court held that the state constitutional provisions which mir-
ror the federal Bill of Rights could be the source of broader individual rights than found
under the federal provisions. In so doing, the court rejected the federal precedent in
the area of searches incident to arrest.
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Cases such as these which expand the protection of individual
rights based upon state constitutional provisions raise substantial
questions concerning the scope of appellate review of these state deci-
sions by the United States Supreme Court. Regardless of what the
Court's analysis of a particular state decision would be on the merits,
review of the state decisions is necessarily predicated upon the Su-
preme Court exercising its appellate review power notwithstanding
the adequate and independent state ground doctrine."
However, the dissent in Disbrow argued that while the state court may have the
power to reject the federal precedent, there should be distinctive conditions within the
state to justify any variance from the federal Supreme Court standard. 545 P.2d at 284.
(Richardson, J., dissenting).
11 The other available methods to allow Supreme Court review are merely remote
possibilities. First, Congress could pass legislation that pervasively regulated the rights
of the accused and the procedures to be followed. Once the congressional design to
occupy the field was established, all state regulations of the subject matter would be
preempted regardless of whether the state regulation impaired the actual operation of
the federal law. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963). This congressional action could conceivably be grounded on the "general wel-
fare" clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 cl. 1; the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
cl. 3; or the "equal protection" clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Use of the general
welfare clause would involve an implementation of the power through the "necessary
and proper" clause, U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8 cl. 18. The argument for using the commerce
clause as a constitutional base would be an extension of the reasoning of the Court in
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). In Perez, the Supreme Court held that
the defendant's loan-sharking activities could be constitutionally proscribed, as a
class, if Congress found that this particular class of activities affected commerce. This
holding disregarded the fact that in the case before the Court, there was no evidence
that defendant's activities had affected interstate commerce. The reasoning of the
Perez Court that activities can be regulated by class could be interpreted to include
virtually every substantive crime, since in modem society most crime, in some manner,
affects or utilizes interstate commerce. If Congress could provide for a code of substan-
tive crimes under the commerce clause, a necessary incident to this power would be
to establish a national code of criminal procedure. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 18.
Support for the position that the equal protection clause provides a ground for
legislating criminal procedure can be found in the case of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966). The Morgan Court upheld an act of Congress which invalidated a New
York statute, but did not find that the state statute itself was violative of the equal
protection clause. By so holding, the Court deferred to the judgment of Congress that
invalidation of the state statute was essential to the enforcement of the equal protec-
tion clause. This reasoning could lead to the conclusion that Congress could legislate
a code of criminal procedure applicable to the states. See Cox, The Supreme Court
1965 Term; Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HAnv. L. REv. 91, 108 (1966).
However, it is doubtful that the framers of the constitution ever intended the
national government to provide a national criminal code. THe FDERALIST No. 82, at
253 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966) (A. Hamilton). In addition, it is probable that all of these
proposed constitutional bases would succumb to Chief Justice Marshall's "pretext"
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The extent of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over
state decisions is established by congressional authorization."6 The
Judiciary Act of 17897 was the legislative enactment first vesting the
Supreme Court with jurisdiction to review state court decisions.
Under the original Judiciary Act, the Court's appellate jurisdiction
was limited in part to review of a state court decision which had
denied a claim of federal right or privilege.68 More than a century
later the scope of review was legislatively modified to enable the
Supreme Court to review state court decisions which upheld federal
rights. 9 The key consideration is whether a federal question was pre-
sented in the state proceeding."
argument for limiting national power. M'Cullouch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 423 (1819). See Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. CoLO.
L. REv. 51 (1973). However, while Congress has shown some interest in the past in
entering the criminal law field (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970) (Interstate and Foreign
Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises)),-the trend is away from
federal centralization. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on
Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM L. REv. 623 (1975).
The second possibility might be a constitutional amendment establishing a uni-
form code of criminal law. The problem with this alternative is that the same parties
who lose power under such an amendment would be required to endorse it, an unlikely
prospect in most state legislatures. See Davidow, One Justice for All: A Proposal to
Establish, by Federal Constitutional Amendment, a National System of Criminal
Justice, 51 N.C.L. Rav. 259 (1972).
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 cl. 2 provides in relevant part:
In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Excep-
tions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
This legislative power to make "exceptions" is generally thought to be unlimited unless
those alterations would emasculate the essential functions of the Supreme Court
within the federal system. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 201-02 (1960). See also Hart, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts; An Exercise in Dia-
lectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953). It has also been suggested that the legislative
power is subject "to compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amend-
ment." Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948).
" Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85-87.
uId.
, Judiciary Act of 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790.
The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is currently codified as 28 U.S.C. §
1257 (1970) and provides in part:
Final judgments or decrees . . . may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court as follows: (3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty
or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the
validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
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However, in Murdock v. City of Memphis," the Supreme Court
established that the presence of a federal question in a case did not
grant the Court broad power to decide all of the questions presented
by the case."2 Consistently adhering to this precept, the Court devel-
oped the doctrine that in cases involving a federal question, the Court
would first look to any nonfederal grounds supporting the decision to
determine whether they independently and adequately sustained the
state court judgment. If there existed an adequate and independent
state ground which supported the judgment, the Supreme Court
would dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction."
In making this determination, the Court has traditionally taken
a deferential attitude toward state court decisions that are ambigu-
ous as to whether federal or nonfederal grounds were relied on in
reaching the decision. In such a case, the Court's practice has been
to grant certiorari and then remand to the state court for clarification
of whether the grounds supporting the decision are federal or nonfed-
eral or both.7 4 The test of "adequacy" under the doctrine is primarily
States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set
up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or com-
mission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
" Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1375, 1376-77 (1961).
,1 E.g., Viator v. Stone, 203 Miss. 109, 37 So. 2d 1, appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 948
(1949); Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U.S. 672 (1913). While this practice somewhat alters
Murdock, which held that a judgment resting on an adequate nonfederal ground
should be affirmed, 87 U.S. at 636, the practical effect of the Supreme Court's dis-
missal for want of jurisdiction is to affirm the judgment of the highest state court. How-
ever, that dismissal arguably would not carry the same force in later state decisions
as would an express affirmance by the Supreme Court. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §
108 at 495 (1970).
1' See Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940), wherein the Minnesota
Supreme Court invalidated a sales tax on both federal and state constitutional
grounds. In its opinion the Minnesota court mentioned the state constitution, but
primarily relied on five federal cases "directly deciding the question presented." Id.
at 554 (emphasis in original). On remand after the Supreme Court had vacated the
judgment, the state court declared that the original decision was based on state consti-
tutional grounds, thereby precluding federal Supreme Court review. National Tea Co.
v. State, 208 Minn. 607, 294 N.W. 230 (1940). But see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975), where there was some doubt over whether federal or nonfederal grounds were
relied on in the state courts. 420 U.S. 714, 726 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Assuming
that there is doubt as to whether federal or nonfederal grounds were relied upon by
the state courts the Supreme Court is not compelled to remand to the state courts for
clarification; rather, the Court itself may examine the record, submit certified ques-
tions to the state courts, or use other techniques to clarify the record and identify the
grounds relied on by the state courts. E.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207
(1960); C. WRIGHT, FFEDERAL COURTS § 107 at 491 (1970).
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a distillation of efforts to cope with the problem of state procedural
requirements that preclude the state courts from reaching the federal
question. 5 However, not every state procedural policy that forecloses
a substantive federal claim will be found inadequate. To the con-
trary, state requirements have only been found inadequate where
they have no precedent in prior state law, 7 where the state rule is
applied with pointless severity," or where its application involves
trivial adherence to form.
78
Although there has been no major modification of the "adequacy"
concept by the Supreme Court in recent years, the decision of Henry
u. Mississippi8 intimated that the traditional definition is not settled
and may be susceptible to change. 8 In Henry, defense counsel failed
to object to an unlawful search in a timely manner as required by
local procedure. On review, the Mississippi Supreme Court withdrew
an initial opinion and held that the defendant had "waived" his right
to object.8 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
held that even if a state procedural rule was fairly applied, in order
to be "adequate" the state requirement must also serve a "legiti-
mate" state interest.8
11 Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 750, 753
(1972). In Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955), Justice Clark concisely stated that
there were two situations in which a state ground would be found inadequate:
First, where the circumstances give rise to an inference that the state
court is guilty of an evasion - an interpretation of state law with the
specific intent to deprive a litigant of a federal right. Second, where
the state law, honestly applied though it may be, and even dictated
by the precedents, throws such obstacles in the way of enforcement
of federal rights that it must be struck down as unreasonably interfer-
ing with the vindication of such rights (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 399 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See generally Note, The Unten-
able Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1375 (1961).
11 NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (nothing in prior
state cases to suggest that certiorari unavailable to enable highest state court to review
a contempt order).
n NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (formal arrangement
of points in brief); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904) (two page motion stricken
as too long and wordy).
11 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 376 U.S. 339 (1964) (typeface and size of
paper incorrect); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) (failure to repeat formally
point already made).
79 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
10 See Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 943 (1965); Sanda-
low, Henry u. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised
Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 187 (1965) [hereinafter Sandalow].
" Henry v. State, 154 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1963); see Sandalow, supra note 80, at
190-93.
11 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965).
1976]
922 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
The effect of this test is to compound the already subjective evalu-
ation of "adequacy" with an additional subjective evaluation of what
constitutes a "legitimate" state interest. While the majority in Henry
professed to decide the case according to settled principles" there are
hints throughout the opinion that the standard for determining ade-
quacy may be changing. 4 Although there has been no change in the
standard during the eleven years since Henry was decided, if the
Court does make an alteration, it will almost certainly be a dilution
of the concept of adequacy" since, even if a state ground passes
muster under the traditional tests of adequacy,86 the Court can still
examine the state interest and find that it is not legitimate. More-
over, the Court could ascertain that while the state interest may
concededly by legitimate, it is nevertheless inadequate because it
may be "substantially served" by some other procedure. 7
To insure expansion of individual rights under state law, it is
essential that the adequate and independent state ground doctrine be
adhered to by the United States Supreme Court. The doctrine pro-
vides a well-established means by which state courts can insulate
their decisions from Supreme Court review.8 In the context of the
recent state criminal cases, such as the Johnson decision,89 the doc-
trine suggests that by basing the expansion of criminal procedural
rights on the state constitution the state court can effectively ignore
the federal precedent in the area and avoid the rigor of Supreme
Court review. Therefore, Supreme Court appellate review of state
criminal decisions such as Johnson, Kaluna, and Disbrow"° would
seem to require a reconsideration of the doctrine that an adequate
and independent state ground acts as a bar to Supreme Court review
of a federal question in a case.
Id. at 452.
, An example of the equivocal nature of the decision is the Court's admonition
that the standard of adequacy in Henry "will not lead inevitably to a plethora of
attacks on the application of state procedural rules." 379 U.S. at 448 n.3. If the deci-
sion was based on settled principles, such a statement would be seemingly unneces-
sary.
's The dissent in Henry anticipated such a change and argued that it "portends a
severe dilution, if not complete abolition, of the concept of 'adequacy' as pertaining
to state procedural grounds." 379 U.S. 443, 457 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" See text accompanying notes 75-98 supra and infra.
" Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448 (1965).
U See Project Report, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARv.
Civ. RIGHTS - Civ. Lie. L. REv., 271, 313-14 (1973).
"See text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
10 See text accompanying notes 44-64 supra.
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The first section of the doctrine that would have to be re-
examined is the test of the "independence" of the state ground. The
Court has traditionally said that a state analysis is independent if it
can withstand the collapse of the federal analysis." Therefore, it
would be possible for the Court to reason that, because of the history
of selective incorporation,9 2 any analysis based on a state constitu-
tional provision which substantially mirrors the language of its fed-
eral counterpart is dependent on analysis of that federal provision. 3
Likewise, selective incorporation has so intertwined the state and
federal provisions protecting the same right that any deprivation of
the right automatically presents a federal question, thereby investing
the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction. However, the Court
has shown a deferential attitude toward state court decisions that
allows "independence" to be established by a simple willingness on
the part of the state court to base the decision on state law grounds. 4
Consequently, the Court has not discussed the effect of incorporation
on the independence of a state constitutional provision, confining
itself to an inquiry into whether the intended basis for the state
decision was federal or state law.
"Adequacy," the second requirement, presents a different prob-
lem. The test for adequacy developed in response to the discrimina-
tory and arbitrary application of state procedural rules to defeat fed-
eral substantive rights. 5 Such is not the case where a state court
relies on a substantive provision in the state constitution to expand
individual rights." In order to declare this ground inadequate, the
Supreme Court could redefine adequacy by reasoning that the history
of incorporation, when coupled with the extended dormancy of state
constitutional provisions," has stripped those provisions of sufficient
adequacy to foreclose Supreme Court appellate review.
Considering these factors, a significant change in the adequate
and independent state ground doctrine does not seem probable. His-
, E.g., Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164
(1917); Creswill v. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912). See Hart,
The Supreme Court 1958 Term; Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 84, 110 & n.76 (1959).
,1 See text accompanying notes 34-42 supra.
,3 Project Report, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HA. Civ.
IGHTS - Civ. LIB. L. REV. 271, 313 (1973).
" Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
, See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
" Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 So. CAL. L. REV. 750, 753
(1972).
," See Countryman, The Role of a Bill of Rights in a Modern State Constitution,
45 WASH. L. REv. 453, 464-66 (1970).
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torically, the Supreme Court has found state grounds untenable when
the deprivation of a federally guaranteed right was involved. Since
state decisions expanding individual rights under state law do not
involve a denial of a federal right, there appears to be no compelling
reason why the Supreme Court should alter the doctrine to facilitate
appellate review. However, the doctrine is judicially created and the
Supreme Court could always return to the scope of the statute which
authorizes appellate review whenever a federal question is pre-
sented." In addition, the Court has the inherent power to define the
parameters of concepts such as "adequacy" and "independence."99
Nevertheless, it is probable that the adequate and independent state
ground doctrine will continue to operate in its present form, thus
providing state courts that disagree with federal precedent a means
to insulate their decisions from Supreme Court review."'
In addition to appellate review by the Supreme Court, the meth-
ods and justifications used by state courts to expand individual rights
raise other questions. Prior to enlarging individual rights under state
law, a state court should clearly and definitively discuss what condi-
tions peculiar to its state justify the court's divergence from Supreme
Court precedent. Unless these distinctive circumstances are present,
state courts should refrain from producing a "shadow tier" of state
constitutional rights' °1 based solely upon the predeliction of a major-
ity of the state court to reach a different result than the United States
Supreme Court.
The propriety of these state decisions is also questionable in view
of the interaction of state expansion of criminal rights and the selec-
tive incorporation doctrine. While the majority of the federal Bill of
Rights was being incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court rejected the notion that an incorporated right applied
" 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970); see text accompanying note 70 supra.
" Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 943 (1965). While the
Supreme Court is invested with broad discretion, it is still proscribed by statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1970), from reviewing a state decision which relies solely on state law
and in which no federal claim is presented. See Falk, The Supreme Court of California,
1971-1972, Foreword: The State Constitution: A More than "Adequate" Nonfederal
Ground, 61 CALIF. L. Rav. 273 (1973).
' Sandalow, supra note 80, at 189. State decisions will not be insulated, however,
if they clearly rest on federal grounds. The Supreme Court has not hesitated to assume
jurisdiction and decide the federal question on its merits. E.g., Michigan v. Mosley,
96 S. Ct. 321 (1975) (state court interpreted fifth amendment rights too broadly);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (state court interpreted confrontation clause
of the sixth amendment too broadly).
10 People v. Disbrow, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370, 545 P.2d 272, 284 (1976) (Richard-
son, J., dissenting).
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to the states only a "watered-down subjective version of the individ-
ual guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 11 2 Although the selective incor-
poration doctrine was developed to provide national protection for
certain basic rights, the inevitable consequence of the doctrine is
"compelled uniformity" of criminal procedure between the state and
federal governments. 03 Whether uniformity is a desirable goal in the
context of federal and state systems is a much-debated question, 104
but there is little doubt that if the incorporation philosophy was
carried to its logical extreme, it would stifle state court efforts to
expand individual rights through state law. The Supreme Court has
never seriously considered such an extreme position,"5 but this does
not obviate the fact that the expansive state decisions are not totally
reconcilable with the selective incorporation philosophy since these
decisions result in a multiplicity of constitutional rules surrounding
the same right.
Another question which state court decisions increasing individ-
ual rights raises is the extent to which the rights of a criminal defen-
dant ought to depend on the cleverness of counsel and on artful
pleading. Once the precedent is set within a particular state for in-
creased protection of individual rights, alert attorneys representing
criminal defendants within that state will plead only deprivations of
rights under state law. In addition to the anticipated favorable ruling
based on the earlier state precedent, framing of the issues in a partic-
ular case will bar any possibility of Supreme Court review since no
federal right or question would be involved."' By contrast, a defen-
"I Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1964), quoting from Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
I Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
I Compare, F. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND PouTcS 192-93 (1939); Friendly, The Bill
of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAIF. L. REv. 929 (1965); with, R.
STREAMER, THE SUPREME COUaT iN CRisis 286 (1971); Davidow, One Justice for All: A
Proposal to Establish by Federal Constitutional Amendment, a National System of
Criminal Justice, 51 N.C.L. REv. 259 (1972).
101 Complete uniformity of criminal procedure would seem to be the result of
Justice Black's proposed "total incorporation" theory. See text accompanying note 31
supra.
101 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970). Although stare decisis suggests a ruling in conformity
with the prior state precedent expanding criminal rights, this will not necessarily be
the result. The risk the criminal defendant assumes by pleading only under state law
is twofold: first, the state court may render a restrictive decision contrary to earlier
decisions and second, the defendant may be subsequently found to have deliberately
bypassed the state courts before asserting his federal rights, thereby "waiving" his
right to assert them in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963). Moreover, the Fay test of "deliberate bypass" of state courts has recently been
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dant who asserts his federal rights may be afforded less protection
since the state court will analyze his case in terms of the more restric-
tive federal precedent. 0 7 Even if he pleads a deprivation of his rights
under both federal and state law, the defendant may find the state
court constrained to judge the case on federal precedent since a fed-
eral question will already have been injected into the case. 8
Compounding these policy considerations is the possibility that
there are more appropriate methods available for state courts to in-
crease individual rights for criminal defendants. The majority of state
decisions expanding criminal rights, exemplified by the Johnson,
Kaluna, and Disbrow cases,' base their opinions on a provision in
the state constitution. While a state constitution remains the primary
repository of rights for the citizens of that state, there are reasons to
believe that a court's reliance on it in a case such as Johnson is
misplaced. First, the state constitutional provision relied on will al-
most invariably be identical or similar to the corresponding provision
in the federal constitution. 10 Although this fact does not prevent a
state court from construing its constitution differently,"' the situa-
tion becomes confusing when the accused demands his rights under
both the federal and state constitution. The court should then distin-
guish the state right from the federal right and express why the result
varies in an identical fact situation based on identical constitutional
language." 2
modified so that an accused would seem to lose almost all ability to assert a federal
right on habeas corpus unless he properly makes the claim first at his trial. If the
criminal defendant fails to assert a federal right at trial, he now has to demonstrate
both reasonable cause why the right was not urged at trial and actual prejudice to his
case. Frances v. Henderson, 44 U.S.L.W. 4620 (U.S. May 3, 1976); Estelle v. Williams,
44 U.S.L.W. 4609 (U.S. May 3, 1976). Arguably, that risk may act as a check upon
defendants only pleading deprivations of state rights, thus limiting the number of state
decisions similar to Johnson, Kaluna, and Disbrow.
I" Although only federal rights are asserted, the court could still give the defen-
dant the benefit of the expanded state protection of individual rights by raising the
issue of rights under state law by the court's own motion. See note 48 supra.
10 E.g., People v. Lumpkin, 394 Mich. 456, 231 N.W. 2d 637 (1975). See note 127
infra.
101 See text accompanying notes 43-65 supra.
11* E.g., The New Jersey Constitution, art. I, T 7 provides that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " This provision mirrors the corre-
sponding provision in the federal Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
E.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940); see note 74 supra.
II! This problem has led many state courts to discuss the state constitutional right
in terms of federal case law and the federal constitutional right in terms of past state
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A second reason for believing that non-constitutional grounds
would be more appropriate for a state decision that enlarges criminal
procedural rights is based on the concept of judicial self-restraint. In
deciding whether to predicate a decision on constitutional grounds,
a state might adopt the judicial rule of the Supreme Court: "[t]he
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question. . . if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed
of." ' Notwithstanding this rule, if a state court decides to interpret
a provision of its state constitution more broadly than the analogous
federal provision, the state court should squarely base its legal or
social justification for the expansion on state law grounds. Doing so
will have the salutary effect of clearly precluding Supreme Court
review of the decision,"' while establishing the state provision as a
viable, independent source of individual rights.
While the use of state constitutional provisions predominates the
analysis of state court decisions according individuals greater protec-
tion of their rights than have certain United States Supreme Court
decisions, it is by no means the only available mode of analysis. There
are two other realistic judicial alternatives upon which a state court
can rely if it wishes to expand criminal rights."' The first of these
alternatives is a state supreme court's power to promulgate rules of
procedure.' 6 Under this power, the highest state court can establish
precedent. E.g., State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (1975). This constitu-
tional interplay is the cause of much of the ambiguity which has motivated the Su-
preme Court under the adequate and independent state ground doctrine to remand
many of the cases for clarification of which authority - state or federal - was relied
on to reach the decision. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
"I Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
" A state supreme court is the final arbiter of state law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Unless a federal question is injected into the case, the United
States Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to review the state decision. See note
99 supra.
"1 A third potential alternative exists in the form of an advisory opinion. If per-
mitted under state law, a state court could render an advisory opinion expanding the
scope of a federal right. Since the federal courts are limited by the "case or contro-
versy" requirement, the state advisory opinion would be free from Supreme Court
review. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. However, this alternative is unrealistic because the
protection vanishes as soon as a case develops in which the defendant relies upon the
expanded federal right granted in the earlier state court advisory opinion. The "case
or controversy" requirement is then met, and the Supreme Court would probably
reverse the case for construing federal rights too broadly. E.g., California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970); see Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L. J. 421, 434 (1974).
M' E.g., VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
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a procedure to be followed by all of the courts of the state handling
criminal prosecutions. Although the power is usually intended to be
limited in scope, it can still be utilized to give the accused more
protection than is required under the Federal Constitution." 7
The second alternative available to a state supreme court would
be to enlarge criminal procedural rights through the use of its general
supervisory authority over the state judicial system. Through this
method, the state supreme court could provide, as a matter of state
law, a higher degree of protection for the accused without having to
distinguish federal cases limiting protection."' However, the major
advantage to adopting this judicial method is the flexibility it allows.
Any decision concerning the scope of criminal rights involves a deli-
cate balancing of the accused's interest in fairness and society's inter-
ests in deterrence and retribution. If the supervisory power is used,
the court can experiment with altering that balance by providing a
right of less than constitutional dimension. After using the new proce-
dural right for a short time, the court can reassess their propriety and
perhaps return to the old system without the necessity of overruling
a decision that held the right so fundamental as to be protected by
the state constitution."9
"I Commonwealth ex. rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968); see
Note, Commonwealth v. Richman: A State's Extension of Procedural Rights Beyond
Supreme Court Requirements, 13 DUQ. L. REv. 577, 608 (1975).
"I In a constitutional holding, a state court decision contravening federal preced-
ent should always distinguish the federal case on the facts and policies underlying the
federal decision. Only by doing this can a rational basis for an expansive state interpre-
tation be established. In comparison, by basing its decision on the supervisory power,
a state court can recognize the federal precedent, but hold that while the federal
constitution might not demand it, the state court believes - as a matter of efficient,
fair judicial administration - that the additional procedural rights should be pro-
vided.
"I The flexibility available by using the supervisory power can be demonstrated
by taking the facts of State v. Johnson as an example. 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975).
The issue involved was the requirement to insure the voluntary nature of consent to a
search. See text accompanying notes 43-51 supra. As a matter of state constitutional
law, the court held that the police must expressly inform the person giving consent of
the right to refuse to consent. 346 A.2d at 68. The United States Supreme Court had
previously held that the "totality of the circumstances" was the appropriate standard.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). If the Johnson court, after
observing the effect of this new individual right, decided that its marginal value to a
criminal defendant was outweighed by the interference with police work, the court
would be confronted with the problem of circumventing its own decision holding the
right to be so fundamental as to be expressly protected by the New Jersey Constitution.
Out of concern for the stability of the judicial system, a state supreme court will seldom
want to reverse itself on a matter of state constitutional law established by its own
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If these alternatives are utilized, the result will be a paradoxical
return to the type of criminal system that existed prior to the enforce-
ment of the federal Bill of Rights against the states through the
selective incorporation doctrine. When criminal defendants increas-
ingly demand their rights under state law,'20 the situation will be
analogous to the historical criminal system where the primary shield
the individual had against state action was to be found under state
law.,
21
Most of the state courts expanding individual rights have invoked
the long history of allowing state governments to experiment with
new and varied policies and procedures. 2 2 However, this principle is
most appropriate when there is little or no Supreme Court guidance
on the particular constitutional right. For example, in the only Su-
preme Court case in which the scope of the eighth amendment's
proscription against unreasonable bail was expressly argued and de-
cided, 2 1 the Supreme Court held that if the amount of bail set was
higher than was needed to persuade the defendant to appear at trial,
it was excessive. ' With only this vague guidance, state courts would
be justified in trying new approaches and systems for determining the
proper amount of bail in each particular case. However, the situation
is not the same when there is specific and persuasive Supreme Court
guidance on the precise question to be decided. When this is the case,
the Supreme Court interpretation should be accorded deference and
generally followed. 2 5 Consequently, although some state courts have
expanded criminal procedural rights in spite of a more restrictive
Supreme Court decision on the point, 2 1 other state courts have de-
recent decision. On the other hand, if the Johnson decision was grounded on the court's
supervisory power, the court could later reverse its decision as ill-advised in view of
its effect in actual operation. The end result of this flexibility would be a fairer, better
balanced criminal system, tempered with the experience of trial and error.
I" See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra.
121 See text accompanying notes 9-23 supra.
12, In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), Justice Harlan extolled:
'[T]he essentially federal nature of our government' . . . one of
whose basic virtues is to leave ample room for governmental and social
experimentation in a society as diverse as ours ....
Id. at 133 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
124 Id. at 5.
'2 Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939); Cohen v. Superior Court,
173 Cal. App. 2d 61, 343 P.2d 286 (1959); People v. Jackson, 22 Ill. 2d 382, 176 N.E.
2d 803 (1961); City of Portland v. Thornton, 174 Or. 508, 149 P.2d 972 (1944).
128 See note 41 supra.
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ferred to the Supreme Court holding in the area.' Thus, if a state
court intends to increase individual rights, while it has the power to
do so, the court should justify its divergence from the Supreme Court
standard by analyzing the particular facts of the case or policies
within the state or behind the state constitutional provision that
make its solution the preferable one. A mere exercise of judicial power
without meaningful justification or reason is the antithesis of princi-
pled decision-making. 12
In considering the various means by which states may expand
criminal procedural rights, a desirable alternative is the legislative
system. A recent legislative enactment in Massachusetts 2 9 may be
the harbinger of state legislative proposals in the future. In 1973, the
Supreme Court modified the law surrounding searches and seizures
incident to arrest by holding that after a custodial arrest, a police
officer could conduct a full scale search of the arrestee's person. 3"
Believing that the scope of the search allowed by these decisions
unreasonably interfered with an individual's privacy, the Massachu-
setts state legislature passed a bill that severely limited the nature
of a search incident to a lawful arrest to the specific purposes of
removing weapons from the arrestee and seizing evidence of the crime
for which the arrest had been made.'31 It is clearly within the power
of the state legislature to pass such a law since it amounts to no more
than a stricter limit on state activities than is required under the
Federal Constitution. 3 2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated, most
recently in Oregon v. Hass, that states have the power to provide for
higher standards of police conduct than required under the Federal
Constitution. "4
Another legislative approach in the search and seizure area was
adopted in Florida.'35 Under this law, most traffic offenses have been
IN Sizemore v. State, 308 N.E. 2d 400 (Ind. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975);
State v. Cromwell, 509 S.W. 2d 144 (Mo. 1974); Hughes v. State, 522 P.2d 1331 (Okl.
1974); State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 213 N.W. 2d 545 (1974).
I See Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 COLUM.
L. REv. 35 (1963); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HAev. L. REv. 1 (1959).
.2 MASS. GEN. LAws, ANN., Ch. 276, § 1 (Supp. 1974).
I" Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973).
" See Arons & Katsh, Reclaiming the Fourth Amendment in Massachusetts, 2
Civ. LiB. REv. 82 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Arons & Katsh].
12 Id. at 83.
', 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
'' Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58,
62 (1967).
"I FLA. STAT. §§ 318.11 et. seq. (1975).
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decriminalized with the result that in many traffic situations the
police do not have authority to arrest. Consequently, there is no basis
for a search incident to a lawful arrest.13 This approach differs from
the Massachusetts-type legislation in that it eliminates certain
searches by denying the police the power to arrest rather than limit-
ing the search subsequent to an arrest.
There are several advantages to either of these legislative initia-
tives as opposed to their judicial counterparts. First, the use of a
legislative statement provides a rational, compact statement of the
law in any given area of criminal procedure. In this way it has signifi-
cant formative advantages over the layering process which is often
inherent in the case-by-case judicial method of rule-making.137 Sec-
ond, the statute can be legislatively reviewed and questionable lan-
guage modified soon after a problem of interpretation arises. This
flexibility is much more responsive and efficient than judicial rules
which are constrained by the "case or controversy" limitation and
must await a similar case to reverse a prior holding., 8 Third, the
facilities for collecting information from a cross-section of society as
to what the proper balance between the rights of the accused and the
interests of society should be are far superior in the legislative sys-
tem."' In comparison, a court has only the evidence that the parties
or amicus briefs can muster during the limited amount of time pre-
ceding trial. 4 ' Finally, the legislative system has the important ad-
vantage of being directly responsible to the citizenry of the state. If
the legislature decides to increase the rights of criminal defendants,
each legislator's position will be subjected to the political pressures
of re-election."'
' See Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L. J.
873, 877 n.20 (1975).
13' Platt, A Legislative Statement of Warrantless Search Law: Poaching in Sacred
Judicial Preserves?, 52 ORE. L. REv. 139 (1973).
'33 Id. at 153.
13, Id.
"' Arons & Katsh, supra note 131.
Arguably, elected state judges are subject to the same democratic check, but
ideally they are individuals who are immune to political pressure and campaign based
on their attributes of integrity and impartiality.
Recently, some judges have voiced approval of using legislative methods to form
criminal procedure standards. E.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), in
which Justice Powell stated:
The same diversity of local legislative responsiveness that marked the
development of economic and social reforms in this country ...
might well lead to valuable innovations with respect to determining
- fairly and more expeditiously - the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused.
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The rapidly developing practice of state courts construing their
state constitutions so as to afford greater protection to individual
rights is not without controversy. First, Supreme Court review of
these state decisions would require a re-examination of the adequate
and independent state ground doctrine. Any relaxation of that doc-
trine as a limitation on the scope of Supreme Court appellate review
of state decisions would not only alter substantial Supreme Court
precedent' but would make it more difficult for state courts to insu-
late their decisions.
In addition to the problem of Supreme Court appellate review,
there are other difficulties surrounding the method by which state
courts are expanding the protection of individual rights. For instance,
most state courts have based their decisions almost entirely on state
constitutional provisions, thereby creating a rigid constitutional rule
with a paucity of analysis on precisely what facts and policies led the
court to hold that the right was deserving of greater constitutional
protection than that accorded by prior United States Supreme Court
decisions. Similarly, the state courts have failed to look to other more
flexible means by which to achieve greater protection of individual
rights. Finally, there has been far too little involvement of the state
legislatures in the process of creating criminal procedural standards.
While the goal of increased protection of individual rights in the
criminal context may be laudable, the means employed to achieve
that protection constitute little more than ad hoc state judicial deci-
sions that more protection is needed.' At a past conference of state
Chief Justices, the group adopted a resolution in response to the
Warren Court's judicial activism, which called upon the Supreme
Court to exercise
Id. at 376 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Likewise,
Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit has encouraged the development of the ALI
model codes, both for substantive and procedural law, and expects that they will "set
workable standards for the police and afford useful guidance for judges." Friendly, The
Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALF. L. REV. 929 (1965).
"I Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309
U.S. 551 (1940); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). See text
accompanying notes 66-100 supra.
" Justice Cardozo recognized the difficulty for any judicial tribunal to justify
significantly its decision when more than simply affirming a prior holding is involved:
[tihe hard judicial work begins when precedents are in conflict or are
non-existent but the hardest work of all confronts the judge when
precedents are ample and clear but social justice demands that they
be reversed.
B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL Pocass 21 (1921).
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[t]he power of judicial self-restraint - by recognizing and
giving effect to the difference between that which, on the one
hand, the Constitution may prescribe or permit, and that
which, on the other, a majority of the Supreme Court, as from
time to time constituted, may deem desirable or undesirable.1
4
In view of the recent state court decisions,' it might be appropriate
for the Supreme Court to re-address and return the resolution to the
state Chief Justices with the same admonition.
GEORGE R. MOORE
' Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. REv. 454, 455 (1970),
quoting from, CouNcn OF STATE GovERNmENTs, PROCEEDINGS OF TENTH ANNUAL MEET-
ING OF THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES 23-24 (1958).
"5 See note 43 supra.

